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1.  Introduction 
Standard life cycle theory and a large empirical literature argue that public 
pension programmes, which provide benefits after a certain age financed out of general 
or hypothecated taxes, affect household behaviour.  First, public provision of retirement 
income affects the propensity of households to engage in private retirement saving and 
also their wealth decumulation strategy later in life.  Second, by driving a wedge between 
the pre- and post-tax wage, publicly-provided pensions affect the gains from work and 
therefore the optimal length and intensity of the working life.  Although studies differ in 
what they are testing and how they test it, there seems to be general agreement that 
public pension programmes affect household behaviour in direct proportion to the 
average level of pension contributions (being a large component of the tax ‘wedge’), in 
proportion to the generosity of the public pension programme (the average ‘replacement 
rate’) and in relation to any specific disincentives to work and save late in life (e.g. 
retirement tests, means-testing of retirement incomes, and the like). 
The literature pays rather less attention to how the design of public pension 
programmes affects these dimensions of household economic activity.  Public pension 
programmes vary substantially in their provisions – not just in average generosity but also 
in, for example, how closely individual public pension entitlements are related to 
individual contributions, in generational differences in the implicit ‘rate of return’ on 
contributions relative to rates of return available in the capital market, and so on.  The 
implications of programme heterogeneity for household behaviour have not always been 
thought through in the existing literature, and variations across countries and over time 
have certainly not been exploited (to my knowledge) to test the underlying theory.  This 
is the purpose of the present paper.   
To illustrate programme heterogeneity: some recent public pension reforms 
(notably in Germany, Italy and Sweden) have been designed explicitly to make the public 
pension programme ‘fairer’ in some actuarial sense (i.e. so that individual benefits are 
more closely matched to individual contributions).  There is an implicit assumption that 
this will ‘improve incentives’ and thereby affect household behaviour.  In effect, making   2
a tax-financed programme appear to be like a private retirement saving plan may cause 
individuals to interpret public pension contributions less as a tax and more as a 
mandatory saving contribution so that the ‘tax wedge’ impact on employment is reduced.  
However this occurs at the expense of making public pensions a closer substitute for 
private retirement saving and thereby potentially reducing private retirement saving.   
In contrast, greater targeting of public pension benefits on poorer pensioners (as 
has happened in, for example, the United Kingdom since the mid-1990s) will certainly 
increase the disincentives both to save and to work later in life for prospective recipient 
households but, by making the programme look less like an actuarial programme, have 
quite different effects on other, better-off, groups in the population.  The net effect on 
incentives to save and work later in life may go in either direction depending on the exact 
design features of the programme, preferences, rates of return and so on. 
Since the key policy trade-off is whether to make the public programme more 
like a tax system (as in the UK, say) or more like a surrogate retirement saving system (as 
in Sweden, say), the optimal direction of pension reform therefore depends on the trade-
off of potential welfare losses arising from reduced retirement saving (such as a lower 
capital stock) against potential losses arising from lower employment (loss of current 
output).  If retirement saving is more sensitive to programme design than employment 
and participation levels (since labour supply responses to changes in average tax rates are 
probably low – see Disney, 2000a), the former loss may be larger than the latter.  But the 
sensitivity of private saving rates to programme design is an empirical issue, and is 
investigated here. 
This paper therefore examines how actual variation in the design of public 
pension programmes across countries and time affects one dimensions of economic 
activity of households: household saving.  In a previous paper (Disney, 2004), I focussed 
on the impact on employment rates.  In the absence of any large volume of literature on 
this topic (see Section 3 for a discussion), there are two broad ways of tackling this issue.  
First, we can match exact prospective benefit entitlements to individual households and 
investigate whether differences in current or subsequent household behaviour (for 
example, the current saving rate, prospective retirement date etc.) correlate with these 
projected benefit entitlements.  Although this approach is feasible for a few countries, 
there are insufficient data sets of this type to undertake a cross-country analysis.  In any 
event, this approach begs the question of whether people understand the programme in   3
sufficient detail to be able to make projections of their own benefits (or benefit-cost 
ratios) based on current criteria (and indeed, on forecasts of future government policy).
1   
In addition, snapshots of household behaviour cannot exploit variation in pension 
regimes across time or country to examine behavioural responses.  
The second broad approach, which is adopted here, is to assume that households 
understand the general provisions of the programmes to which they contribute.  They 
broadly understand, for example, whether programme benefits and contributions are 
earnings-related (‘Bismarck’) or are designed to provide a basic income floor 
(‘Beveridge’).   Moreover, households understand what, in general terms, they pay into 
the programme relative to what they expect to get out of it.  Using a representative-
household approach, we can then exploit cross-country and cross-time period variation 
in the average characteristics of programmes in order to examine differences in aggregate 
saving rates.  The paper shows that the design of the programme, in the twin senses of 
variations in within-cohort and across-cohort ‘returns’ on contributions, does indeed 
affect household saving rates. As such, the study extends in a new direction the existing 
work (from OECD and others) that simply focuses on the effect on macroeconomic 
aggregates of the average generosity and budgetary costs of public pension programmes. 
The next section of the paper briefly examines the design of public pension 
programmes in a standard framework.  It then suggests how design differences might be 
expected to affect various dimensions of household behaviour, a priori.  It also surveys 
the existing empirical literature (most of which ignores programme design issues 
completely).  Section 3 then provides a brief account of the construction of the key 
variables.  Section 4 contains econometric evidence that shows quite clearly that public 
pension programme design matters; moreover, careful specification of these design 
features appears to obtain greater precision in the estimate of the average effect of public 
pension – notably of the degree of ‘saving offset’ arising from the public pension 
programme.  Section 5 then summarises the main conclusions of the paper.          
2.  Theory and existing literature 
2.1.     Some basic analytics 
                                                 
1    See Dominitz, Manski and Heinz (2003) for an explicit attempt to model household pension 
expectations in the United States and, for a more general discussion of pension expectations in several 
countries, Boeri, Börsch-Supan and Tabellini (2001).   4
This sub-section illustrates the main arguments with a minimum of formality. 
using a simple two period OLG model.  I broadly follow the notation of Lindbeck and 
Persson (2003).  Generations are denoted by t, t+1 and periods of the life are denoted 
i=1,2.  The individual consumer/household works in period 1 and is retired in period 2, 
with known date of mortality and no bequests.   
Suppose there is a public pension programme paying benefit b in the second 
period and financed by a payroll tax proportional income tax in period 1 levied at rate τ.   
Second period consumption can then be written as: 
21 1 [( 1 ) ] ( 1 ) tt t cy c r b τ =− −+ +         ( 1 )  
where c is consumption and r is the rate of interest, and y is labour income where 
y=w l; w is the wage rate and l is some measure of lifetime labour supply.  If individuals 
cannot borrow in period 1 against future public pension income, second period 
consumption is determined by first period saving, by the real rate of interest, and by the 
size of the public pension benefit. 
Assume that the public pension programme is financed on a pay-as-you-go 
(PAYG) basis – that is, out of current taxation.  Again following the standard notation, 
write: 
11 1 1 ˆˆ ˆ tt t t t t nb n w l τ ++ + + =          ( 2 )  
where hats over variables denote population averages and n denotes the size of 
the generation.  This simply says that the total value of benefits paid is equal to the 
payroll tax rate times the total wage bill.  The average ‘return’ on contributions for a 
member of generation t can be written as: 
ˆˆ ˆ /( 1 ) tt t t bw l G τ =+            ( 3 )  
This states that the internal rate of return on contributions, G, depends on the 
average stream of benefits relative to the average total value of contributions paid by a 
member of that generation. Substituting for b in (2), denoting  1/ tt nn +  as (1+n) and 
1 ˆˆ / tt ww +  as (1+g), write: 
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++ ++ = +           ( 4 )    5
With a constant tax rate and a constant labour force participation rate, we get the 
standard Aaron-Samuelson result that the sustainable long run ‘return’ on public pension 
contributions, G*, is approximately equal to the growth of population and the growth of 
real wages.  With dynamic efficiency, this rate should normally be less than r, and this 
discrepancy is sometimes called the ‘implicit tax’ associated with PAYG finance of public 
pension.   However, if governments can increase the participation rate of contributors 
within the public pension programme, or else levy ever-increasing tax rates, G will 
temporarily exceed G* for a period of time and for particular generations (this is 
especially likely for the earliest generations in a newly-instituted programme). 
To illustrate how the design of the public pension programme matters, I continue 
to assume that the payroll tax, τ, is proportional to the wage, so specific design features 
are illustrated through the specification of the public pension benefit, b.  Assume, 
therefore, that the public pension benefit is part-‘Beveridge’ and part-‘Bismarck’ along 
the lines described by Casamatta, Cremer and Pestieau (2000), as in (5): 
(1 ) (1 ) ˆ
tt G by b α ατ +− =+             ( 5 )  
Here, the average benefit paid is composed of two components.  The first 
component, weighted by α, is the fraction of the benefit that is proportional to earnings 
and earns the average ‘return’ on contributions G.  This is the ‘Bismarck’ component of 
the programme.  The second component, weighted by (1−α), pays a flat benefit b (or 
some other formula) entirely unrelated to individuals’ contributions to the programme.  
This is the ‘Beveridge’ component of the programme. 
 Substituting (5) into second period consumption in (1), we get: 
21 1 (1 (1 ))
(1 )
(1 ) [1 ](1 ) tt t
rG
r





− =− − + −          (6) 
To see what implications this programme design has for the average tax rate on 
the individual, we can consider several simplifications of this rather cumbersome 
formula.  Suppose first that r = G and α = 1.  This is the case where the public 
programme effectively imitates a private retirement saving programme – the last term 
and the term in τ drop out.  So long as the mandatory retirement saving rate through the 
public programme does not exceed the saving that the individual would have undertaken 
himself or herself, the programme has no impact on individual labour force participation 
and there will be a one-to-one offset of private retirement saving.   6
A straightforward simplification also arises if we assume r = G but that 0 < α < 
1.  The programme departs from actuarial fairness only insofar as part of the pension 
benefit paid by the programme is unrelated to individual contributions.  The lack of 
actuarial fairness can be measured by differences in replacement rates across individuals 
within a generation i.e. a departure from an actuarial basis to the programme in an 
intragenerational sense.  (6) then simplifies to: 
21 1 (1 ) [1 ](1 ) (1 ) tt t cy c r b α τ α − =− − + − −          ( 6 a )  
 Therefore, the greater the degree to which the system departs from actuarial 
fairness, as measured by (1 − α), the higher the ‘tax component’ of the public pension 
contribution, τ.  The impact on the aggregate saving rate then depends on the effects on 
the saving of the ‘gainers’ relative to the ‘losers’. 
Conversely, suppose r ≠ G and α =1.  I term this a departure from intergenerational 
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The average tax component of the contribution is simply the difference between 
the return on saving and the ‘return’ on public pension contributions as defined by (3). 
In practice, public pension programme contributions contain a ‘tax component’ 
arising from departures from both actuarial fairness and intergenerational equity, 
although the extent of these relative deviations depends on the design of the programme.  
It is measuring these departures from an actuarial programme, and measuring the 
impacts of these divergences on labour supply and saving behaviour, that form the 
empirical part of the paper. 
2.2.    Impact of the public pension programme on household saving 
The argument that public pension contributions reduce household saving rates is 
straightforward.  If contributions to a public pension programme are a perfect substitute 
for private retirement saving, public pension contributions should offset private saving 
one to one.  However there are various well known caveats to this interpretation of public 
pension contributions.   First, some private saving may not be for retirement (e.g. for   7
buffer stock or precautionary motives) and so measured offset coefficients may be lower. 
Second, where mandatory saving (i.e. contributions to the public programme) exceeds 
that which the individual would have done in the absence of the public programme, 
lifetime consumption as well as saving may be affected.  Third, there are various issues 
concerning the correct measurement and interpretation of private saving, especially when 
we consider the decumulation phase of funded private pensions and indeed public 
pension itself (e.g. Jappelli and Modigliani, 2003).  
The preceding analysis suggests that the design of the public pension programme 
should have an impact on the extent of the saving offset.  In the intergenerational 
comparison, the closer the programme is to a saving programme (i.e. where R = g), the 
greater the potential offset for private saving because of the substitutability between 
contributions to the public pension programme and a private retirement saving plan 
(leaving aside differences in the risk characteristics of the respective portfolios).   
Where the public programme departs from an actuarial pension plan in an 
intragenerational sense, the analysis of the potential offset effect is more complicated.  If 
the public programme is highly redistributive within a generation towards lower earners, 
poorer households will have an incentive to save less, whereas higher earners do not 
receive a return on their contributions equivalent to a private retirement plan and their 
saving will be hardly affected.  The offset should therefore be highest among low earners.  
But since, as a matter of fact, most private saving is done by high lifetime earners, the 
average measured offset should be lower the higher the degree of redistribution within 
the programme.  The only qualification to this is if the programme differentially affects 
the retirement behaviour of high and low income earners – the ‘induced retirement 
effect’ noted by Feldstein (1974). 
2.2.1.  Empirical evidence on the saving offset from public pension 
programmes 
There is a substantial empirical literature on how contributions to public pension 
programmes affect private saving rates.
2  Several studies calculate prospective public 
pension entitlements across households and examine whether these values are associated 
with differences in household saving rates (as in, for example, Kotlikoff, 1999, Hubbard, 
1986, Alessie, Kapteyn, and Klijn, 1997).  Results are sensitive to the calculation of 
expected pension wealth and the measures used to calculate prospective wealth (e.g. 
                                                 
2   For a selective survey, see Disney (2000b).   8
current and predicted earnings) are likely also to exert an independent effect on 
household saving; moreover, there has to be regime variation to examine differences in 
behaviour across alternative types of programmes.  Some of the studies find weak 
relationships at best; indeed Kotlikoff argued that his results “…cast doubt on the ability 
of people to accurately project their public pension benefits and their age of retirement; 
large differences in lifetime wealth generated by the public pension system do not appear 
to influence savings” (ibid. p.408).   
A few recent studies do explore the promising avenue of using pension regime 
changes in order to measure offsets of private retirement saving arising from public 
pension programmes using household data, notably Attanasio and Brugiavini (2003) and 
Bottazzi, Jappelli and Padula (2004) for Italy and Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003) for 
the UK, but such studies are relatively unusual and generally limited to one ‘reform’. 
Most studies of the ‘offset’ between public pension programmes and private 
saving therefore use either time series methods, or country cross sections, or a 
combination thereof.  The seminal paper by Feldstein (1974) estimated a time series 
model of consumption spending regressed on income, public pension wealth (SSW; both 
gross and net of contributions) and other household wealth for the US economy 1929-
71.   From it, he calculated that total private household saving was approximately halved 
by public pension wealth.  This article spawned a good deal of controversy concerning 
methodology, data and estimation methods. A flaw in the programming was 
subsequently corrected (e.g. Feldstein, 1996) but Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) argued that 
the measure of the replacement ratio should take account of the cohort-by-cohort 
variation in expected RRs rather than simply assuming a constant RR as Feldstein did 
(bar the major change in benefit rules that occurred in 1972).  With the revised 
specifications, they found no offset between SSW and saving. 
 In another paper, Feldstein (1987) calculates the trade-off for various parameter 
values between a means-tested public pension programme that encourages some 
households to stop retirement saving completely but which requires a lower contribution 
rate, and a comprehensive Bismarck-style earnings-related programme that requires a 
higher contribution rate and which encourages all participants to reduce their retirement 
saving by some fraction.  In general, his simulations suggest that the net impact on 
household saving will be higher in a comprehensive public pension programme (that is 
where α and τ are higher, in the terminology of Section 2) than in programmes where   9
benefits are specifically targeted, although of course in the latter case some households 
will not save at all in order to avoid the prospective impact of the means test in 
retirement. 
Finally, we can note that several papers approach the issue of public pension 
programmes and retirement saving using cross-country data sets, with mixed results.   
Early studies such as Barro and MacDonald (1979) and Koskela and Viren (1983) found 
no evidence that more generous public pension programmes (proxied simply by public 
pension/GDP ratios with additional demographic controls) reduce household saving. In 
contrast, a short panel analysis of 12 OECD countries by Feldstein (1980) suggests that a 
‘10% percentage increase in the benefit-to-earnings ratio reduces the saving rate by 
approximately 3 percentage points’ (ibid, p.236).  More recently, Callen and Thimann 
(1997) suggest that demographic dependency, the ratio of direct taxes to GDP and the 
ratio of gross transfers to GDP all have adverse effects on household saving in a long 
panel of 21 OECD countries, although public pension generosity is not included among 
the variables.  Recent studies with greater samples of countries and greater econometric 
sophistication (e.g. Loayza et al, 2000) find evidence that private and household savings 
rates are affected by demographics but do not include any variables that reflect public 
pension wealth or other proxies.  No studies, therefore, to the author’s knowledge, utilise 
public pension programme design as a variable in cross-country estimates of the 
determinants of household saving. 
3.  Empirical estimates  
3.1.   Data and methods: core variables 
The empirical analysis here is conducted for 21 OECD countries for which 
consistent data are available over a long period, in fact allowing the construction of a 
panel of three decades.  The variable to be explained, the household saving rate as a 
percentage of GDP, is taken from IMF sources (primarily cited in Callen and Thimann, 
1997), updated from the OECD database.   
The analysis assumes that a ‘representative agent’ is considering future retirement 
in each country in three periods: the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s (I take mid-points of the 
decades) and define the variables in turn.  The average public pension replacement rate 
(Pension RR) uses rates calculated by Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998).  These rates are 
projected replacement rates for workers in their mid-50s, when they subsequently retire,   10
for each period and country (the authors provide several replacement rates at each point 
in time, the variation in which is also exploited – see below).   
I do not use actual reported contribution rates to public pension programmes, as 
these are often notional rates (including zero).  Instead, I use data from the ILO (with 
some adjustments, described in the Appendix to the present paper) to construct ratios of 
workers to pensioners in each period (see Appendix Table A1; this is the variable 
support ratio in some tables below).  Given the average replacement rates from Blöndal 
and Scarpetta, these support ratios can then be used to calculate ‘effective’ contribution 
rates using equation (2) above – these are the contribution rates that are effectively being 
levied to finance the current outgoings of the public pension programme given 
demographics and expected current replacement rates.  These calculated values, 
described in Table A2, are the contribution rate used in the later empirical estimates.  
Note that estimates of internal rates of return to pension contributions (see below) 
require that this calculation of contribution rates be made for each decade from the 
1950s to the 1990s.   
Several variables are used to capture the design features of the public pension 
programme.  The first, termed a pension tax, is designed to measure the deviations of 
rates of return within cohorts arising from variations in replacement rates across 
household types.  It is intended to capture the term (1 − α) in equation (5), and therefore 
to measure departures from what I termed intragenerational ‘actuarial fairness’ in Section 
2.  To construct the variable, I calculate the coefficient of variation of replacement rates 
across several household types in the same country and year (delineated by level of 
income and number of people in the household) using the data contained in Blöndal and 
Scarpetta (1998) for several household types.  If every household type receives the same 
replacement rate, the value is zero; the highest value is for Australia in 1995, where the 
coefficient of variation is almost 0.4.
3  This coefficient of variation, multiplied by the 
average contribution rate, gives the variable pension tax used in the statistical analysis. 
The second variable is intended to capture differences in intergenerational rates of 
return over time and country to public pension contributions, and involves rather more 
computation.  It is termed IRR at 65 in the ensuing tables, and involves estimating, for a 
representative agent in each country and period, the expected internal rate of return from 
                                                 
3   Other higher values of this ‘pension tax’ include New Zealand, the UK and Ireland, all of which 
have ‘Beveridge’-type pension regimes.  See Disney (2004) for graphical illustrations.   11
retiring at age 65, akin to the G in equation (3) above.  The method of constructing these 
internal rates of returns is described in the Appendix and in Disney (2004). It utilises the 
average replacement rates constructed by Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) to generate 
expected pension replacement rates for three cohorts born in 1920, 1930 and 1940 and, 
therefore, broadly retiring in the mid 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. Given the calculated 
contribution rates over time, in each decade the contribution rate is applied to average 
earnings over the contributor’s working life, which grow in each decade in real terms (the 
earnings index is obtained from OECD data).   This gives the total value of contributions 
paid.  The replacement rate is then applied to real earnings at retirement, and the pension 
is increased in line with subsequent earnings growth if earnings indexation is in place or 
price indexation otherwise.  The method adjusts for differential normal retirement age 
and life expectancy across countries (although the benchmark estimates use a common 
retirement age of 65), as well as changes over time, and for survivors’ benefits paid at the 
appropriate rate for that country until the spouse’s expected age of death. 
The internal rate of return is then computed as that rate of return at which the 
present value of the (negative) stream of contributions paid is equal to the present value 
of the (positive) stream of pension benefits.  Appendix Table A3 gives the calculated 
values.  Note the wide variation across countries but the almost universal fall in IRRs 
after the first decade.  At just over 1%, the average IRRs for the generations born in 
1930 and 1940, are likely to be well below r in equation (1), illustrating the ‘implicit tax’ 
from PAYG financing and the above-average returns obtained by the first generation.  
However actual cohort IRRs have typically been higher than those calculated in Table A3 
because individuals have been permitted to retire earlier than age 65.  I also use these 
IRRs at actual expected retirement dates as an alternative indicator variable. 
The correlation matrix for these measures of public pension programme design 
show a strong positive correlation between the average generosity of the programme, as 
measured by Pension RR, and the contribution rate.  Remembering that the latter is 
calculated from applying equation (2) above using the support ratio and the average 
replacement rate, this tells us that variations in contribution rates are almost wholly 
driven by variations in replacement rates rather than by differences in demographics – 
the correlation between support ratios and contribution ratios is of course negative.  So 
the table shows that there would be a significant collinearity problem if we were to 
include both replacement rates and contribution rates in the same regression (quite apart 
from any econometric issues arising from the construction of the latter variable).   12
Second, there is a negative correlation (although not so strong) between the 
‘pension tax’ variable and the contribution rate.  This simply suggests that countries with 
highly redistributive (Beveridge) programmes have less costly public pension 
programmes than countries that link benefits more closely to earnings (Bismarck).   
Thirdly, and gratifyingly from an econometric point of view, the calculated ‘IRRs at 65’ 
do not strongly correlate with the other pension variables.  
 












Rate  1.0000 -  -  -  - 
Pension 
RR  0.9500 1.0000  -  -  - 
Pension tax  −0.4834  −0.5673  1.0000 -  - 
Support 
Ratio  −0.6440  −0.3932  0.0854 1.0000  - 
IRR at 65  0.0513 0.1431  −0.2586  0.1455 1.0000 
 
Two other variables characterising the public pension programme are included in 
the regressions.  The first, Retirement test index, measures the intensity with which a 
retirement test is applied to those over state pension age.  This indicator variable uses 
information from OECD and the US Social Security Administration’s description of 
country-specific pension programmes and takes 4 values as follows: 
0 = no retirement or earnings test 
1 = retirement or earnings test but deferral of pension permitted and earnings threshold 
for test>0 
2 = retirement or earnings test but either deferral permitted or some earnings exempt from 
test 
3 = full retirement test – pension receipt conditional on full retirement; no opportunity 
for deferral of pension. 
The second, Earliest pension age, is the earliest age at which individuals can 
obtain the normal state pension, taken from the same source. 
3.2.   Other variables 
Other control variables are included (although some are omitted from the 
illustrated specifications due to lack of significance).  These include the Blanchard-
Wolfers (2000) measure of Demand shocks, and GDP growth.     13
To capture capital market imperfection, I follow Jappelli and Pagano (1994) in 
constructing measures of financial repression (liquidity constraints), the argument being 
that differential changes in the availability of finance over time across countries may also 
affect household saving.  Jappelli and Pagano (J-P) use three indices of credit availability: 
consumer credit as a percentage of NNP, credit to the financial sector as a percentage of 
GDP, and the maximum loan-to-value ratio in house purchase.  The first of these is not 
available for a sufficient number of countries, but the other two indices can be updated 
from a variety of sources.
4  Note that ‘credit to the financial sector’ also include credit to 
firms, and that borrowing from banks by companies may be an indicator of the lack of 
development of an equity market rather than reflecting the lack of a credit market for 
consumers. 
4.      Empirical estimates 
4.1.   Impact of programme design on household saving rates 
This section provides results on the impact of the design of the public pension 
programme on household saving rates.  It departs from the traditional literature in 
Section 3.2 in considering explicitly design parameters of the programme in addition to 
‘traditional’ measures of cost and generosity.  Note that we are here assuming that current 
household saving is associated with the parameters of the pension regime calculated for a 
person in their mid-fifties expecting to retire at 65.  Clearly the household saving rate is a 
weighted average of the saving of all age groups, and it is a strong assumption that young 
savers also expect the same public pension regime to be place when they retire.  There 
are two reasons for using this approach.  First, we simply do not have age-specific saving 
data for enough countries.  Second, aggregate household saving is typically dominated by 
the discretionary (active) saving of people in late middle age (from standard empirical 
observations of the life cycle theory, as in Jappelli and Modigliani, 2003), which is exactly 
the point in the life cycle at which replacement rates, IRRs etc. are calculated here.
5   
Table 1 provides some simple descriptive statistics for the variables used in the 
analysis, some of which have already been described in greater detail in the previous 
                                                 
4     From OECD Economic Outlook, the BIS, IMF Financial Statistics and HM Treasury’s evaluation 
of the UK’s housing market for the ‘five economic tests’ for membership of the European single 
currency.  
5    On this last point, see the discussion of Feldstein (1974) and Leimer and Lesnoy (1982) earlier; our 
position of using expected replacement rates of people within a decade of retirement is perhaps midway 
between that of Feldstein (who uses current replacement rates of the elderly projected forward) and 
Leimer and Lesnoy who use actual outcomes ex post.    14
section or in the Appendix.  Of particular note from Table 1 are the high variances of 
saving and contribution rates, and the range of the IRR variables and the pension (public 
pension) replacement rate.  The ‘pension tax’ variable is an absolute tax rate and the 
mean is relatively low because the countries that have low values of α tend to have low 
contribution rates (‘Beveridge’ countries) so that [(1 −α)  × the contribution rate] is 
relatively low. 
Table 1 
Means, standard deviations, minima and maxima of variables 
Variable  Mean Std.  Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Dependent variable       
Household saving rate (%)  11.4  6.2  −3.6  24.9 
       
Public pension variables       
Contribution rate (% wage bill)  25.1  9.6  11.6  57.7 
Pension RR (% of wage)  59.8  17.3  28.9  120 
Support ratio   2.5  0.36  2.0  3.7 
Pension tax (%)  3.4  2.3  0.02  6.9 
IRR (%)  3.1  2.3  −1.6  12.0 
IRR at 65 (%)  2.0  2.2  −0.5  10.3 
Retirement test index (0 to 3)  1.2  1.1  0  3 
Earliest pension age (years)  61.6  3.4  55  68 
        
Other variables       
Demand shock (% × 100)  0.2 7.4  −30.6  14.3 
GDP growth  (% × 100)  2.8 1.4  −1.0  5.8 
Max LTV ratio (%)  76.1  11.7  50.0  95.0 
Fin credit as % of GDP  61.4  31.5  21.0  169 
Union density (%)  43.1  19.6  14.5  90.0 
Employment protection index  2.3  1.1  0.2  4.0 
        
 
Note:   For list of countries and periods used, see Tables A1 to A3 
As a benchmark for what follows, Table 2 provides three ‘traditional’ empirical 
specifications of the life cycle model which alternately utilise, as indicators of the public 
pension programme’s impact on the household saving rate, the public pension 
contribution rate and the average pension (public pension) replacement rate.  One of the 
specifications includes the additional ‘financial repression’ variables.  The standard 
empirical model predicts that a higher contribution rate and/or a higher pension RR in 
the public pension programme (which, as we have seen, are strongly positively 
correlated) should reduce private household saving, with a likely ‘offset coefficient’ of 
between zero and unity.  Standard life cycle theory (e.g. Modigliani, 1986) suggests that a 
higher support ratio raises household saving.  The LCH theory also suggests that higher   15
GDP growth should affect saving positively and positive demand shocks might 
increase saving in the standard permanent income framework.  
Table 2 
Household saving rates, by measures of cost and 
generosity of public pension programme 
 
Dep. Variable: 
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Financial credit as % GDP 
 


















     
















Estimated by generalised least squares, weighted by civilian employment; country dummies included; 
standard errors in parentheses. ***=1%, **=5%, *=10% significance.  N=63 (21 countries in 1975, 
1985, 1995). 
 
The estimates in Table 2 suggests that a higher contribution rate to the public 
programme (column 1) and a higher public replacement rate (column 2) raise household 
saving rates.  The coefficients are weakly significant, but not large.  These results are of 
course not consistent with the standard LCH-based substitutability hypothesis but they 
are not unknown in the cross-country/time series literature.  Household saving rates are 
strongly positively associated with variations in the support ratio, as theory would 
suggest.  The positive association with demand shocks is also consistent with theory.    16
There are large country-specific effects (not included) and evidence of a fall in household 
saving rates, ceteris paribus, in the later decades relative to the 1970s.  Finally, the financial 
repression variables do not add explanatory power. 
The financial repression literature in general suggests that household saving rates 
are negatively associated with indicators of liberalised credit markets, such as higher credit 
as a percentage of GDP or the maximum loan-to-value ratio, if higher deposits or own 
finance are required for purchase of consumer durables in less liberalised credit markets.  
However, as Jappelli and Pagano (1994) point out, these indicators are imperfect 
measures of underlying market liberalisation and, moreover, the development of credit 
market institutions may be associated with greater volumes of savings in formal, 
measurable, channels.  The reason for including these variables here is that several of 
these countries have undergone significant changes in their credit and capital markets 
over the period.   This last point also reiterates that all the specifications in this paper 
include country and time dummies – identification comes from within-group (country) 
changes, not from pure cross-country differences in institutions and public pension 
regimes.  This may be one reason why our results differ from some other studies. 
Table 3 presents our preferred specifications where public pension programme 
design features are included.  From the discussion in the Section 2, the offset should be 
be greatest where the public programme is a close substitute to private saving.  This 
substitutability, I argued, is highest where (1 − α) is low (i.e. Pension tax is low) and (r − 
G) is also low (i.e. IRR at 65 or IRR is high).  So we should expect a positive impact of 
pension tax on household saving and a negative impact of IRR at 65 on saving. 
These predictions are almost exactly confirmed by Table 3, with well-specified 
parameter values.  A higher pension tax component is associated with higher household 
saving, whereas a higher average IRR on contributions reduces saving.  Columns (1) and 
(2) differ in using the calculated IRR at age 65 and the IRR based on actual retirement 
date.  There is little difference in parameter values between the two measures, and use of 
IRR at 65 is probably preferable simply because the IRR at actual retirement date may be 
affected by any induced retirement effect and because the likelihood is also improved.  
Including the pension replacement rate in the regression (not shown) does not affect 
these parameter estimates or their significance and the replacement rate variable 
continues to have the ‘wrong’ sign.   17
Table 3 
Household saving rates, by measures of public pension programme design 
 
Dep. Variable: 
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Estimated by generalised least squares, weighted by civilian employment; country dummies included; 
standard errors in parentheses.   ***=1%, **=5%, *=10% significance.  N=63 (21 countries in 1975, 
1985, 1995). 
 
As before, the support ratio is positively and strongly associated with household 
saving, there are time effects (larger relative to the results in Table 2) and demand shocks 
enter with the correct sign.  The two variables concerning the parameters of the 
retirement regime appear to have no effect on household saving.   
Column  (3) adds the financial repression variables and GDP growth.  The latter 
has the ‘correct’ sign but is insignificant, and also reduces the significance of ‘demand 
shocks’, suggesting some collinearity.   One of the financial repression variables is also   18
significant, albeit the positive sign is not consistent with the standard argument that 
higher loan-to-value ratios reduce the need for saving (for example, for deposits and 
part-self finance of house purchases).  Moreover, inclusion of these additional variables 
also  heightens the reduction in saving in the 1980s and 1990s relative to the 1970s. 
Given inevitable measurement problems in the calculation of these indicator 
variables, the results in Table 3 (especially when compared to Table 2) are perhaps 
surprisingly conclusive in suggesting that the design of public pension programmes 
matters if we are to understand the impact of such programmes on household saving 
rates.   
4.2.  Simulating public pension reforms 
The estimates in Section 4.1 suggested that there is a strong link between the 
design of the public pension programme and the household saving rate.  Using these 
indicators of programme design, how would a given pension reform affect household 
saving rates?  In this section, I simulate some simple programme reforms to show how 
changing the programme design might affect household saving rates given the parameter 
values derived earlier. 
The link between low saving and a public pension programme has been at the 
heart of the US debate on public pension reform, although it is fair to say that elsewhere 
in the world, reforming public pensions in order to raise the saving rate has been very 
much a secondary consideration compared to other pressing motives for reform (rapid 
ageing, and the sustainability of the public finances).  It is of course true that the 
development of a public pension programme lowers the measured saving rate simply 
because public pension contributions are not treated as ‘saving’ in conventional national 
accounts (Jappelli and Modigliani, 2003).  ‘Privatizing’ the public pension programme by 
replacing it with, for example, a system of individual private retirement accounts would 
therefore raise the measured household saving rate.  Moreover, as Gokhale, Kotlikoff 
and Sabelhaus (1996) point out, the increasing annuitization of retirement wealth implied 
by the development of pension programmes will also reduce other measured wealth in 
the economy.  In their analysis, the fall in the US saving rate since the 1950s has been 
driven largely by demographics, by cohort-specific changes in preferences for 
consumption, and by growing annuitization of wealth.  Engen and Gale (1997), in their 
survey of studies of public pension reform and saving, also add caution to the idea that 
public pension reform will significantly change household saving rates, once we allow for   19
these measurement issues.  However, we should not focus on what are essentially 
reforms that raise saving by redefining programme components as saving. 
As a simple first step, we can examine the residual ‘country effects’ once we 
control the effect of the independent regressors.  Re-estimating the equation in Table 3, 
column (3) and suppressing the constant, the marginal effects of the country dummies in 
the panel estimates are illustrated in Figure 1.  Fro m  Figure  1, it  is apparent that a 
number of the ‘Anglo-Saxon’ countries have negative intercepts whereas (particularly) 
some of the Mediterranean countries are characterised by above-average saving rates.  
Note in particular the US, where the country-specific saving rate is 7% below the 
average.  However the actual US household saving rate was only 4.5% below the average 
over the period, suggesting that a combination of demographics, the design of the public 
pension programme in the US and the other independent variables raised the US saving 
rate relative to this crude counterfactual.   
Figure 1






































































































































































        
Reflection on these US characteristics provides a simple explanation of why this 
is the case.  The US support ratio is somewhat above average, due to more favourable   20
demographic circumstances than other countries (especially in Europe) in the past, and 
higher labour force participation of, particularly, women.  As Tables 2 and 3 show, this 
has a strong impact on household saving.  Moreover, the US public pension 
programme’s design is such as to reduce the offset on saving: the internal rate of return 
has been below average (at least in the first two decades – see Table A3) and the ‘bend’ 
points and other non-linearities in the programme provide departures from an ‘actuarial-
based’ programme. Both characteristics, by the reasoning here, reduces the 
substitutability of the programme for private household saving. 
  A simple method of examining the reform of public pension programmes is to 
give a particular country the specific characteristics of another country’s public pension 
programme whilst retaining the country’s other characteristics (e.g. demographics, 
financial market development).  This can again be illustrated by reference to the United 
States (experiments for other countries would obtain similar magnitudes).   
Assuming outright abolition of public pension is not feasible, we might consider 
a stylised reform in which public pension was reduced to the bare minimum of an 
income-tested ‘floor’ to supplement a largely privatised system, such as is the case in 
Chile.  Within the data set, Australia is the closest approximation to this with an average 
replacement rate some 15-20 percentage points below that of the US and extensive 
means-testing.  We can recalculate the variable ‘pension tax’ for the US to have an 
Australian-style average replacement rate and value of (1 −  α) and, to heighten the 
comparison, set the internal rate of return at 65 to zero.  By the argument of preceding 
sections, this would be a public pension programme with very little substitutability for 
household saving, thereby raising the latter.  Implementing this experiment, I calculate 
that this would only have a significant effect on US household saving in the last period, 
raising it by 0.6 percentage points from 5.2% to 5.8% (which is nevertheless a 12% 
increase in the saving rate). 
Conversely, to illustrate where the US lies in the spectrum of programmes, we 
could have a counterfactual where the US programme is akin to a more ‘Bismarckian’ 
programme with a minimal ‘pension tax’ component and an internal rate of return at the 
75
th percentile of the observed distribution of rates of return in the sample.  By the 
analysis here, this should lower the household saving rate in the US still further.  In fact, 
this reform has very little effect in the last decade, because the IRRs are closely bunched 
and the US’s IRR is not particularly low.  In the first two decades, however, had the US   21
had such a generous system, the household saving rates would have been 0.5 percentages 
points lower (7.7 rather than 8.2) and 1.3 percentage points (5.5 rather than 6.8) – 
decreases of 6% and 19% respectively.   These are not trivial numbers but they do 
suggest that, simple definitional considerations aside, public pension reform is not a 
‘magic bullet’ for changing household saving rates – that is, once we consider practical 
public pension regime changes and not hypothetical simulations where public pension is 
abolished or where contributions to programmes are redefined as ‘saving’. 
5.  Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of the design of public pension programmes on 
household saving rates using a short panel of OECD countries.  Previous literature that 
considered the impact of public pension programmes on household economic activity, 
with very few exceptions, either treated public pensions solely as a substitute for private 
saving or, if interested in employment and unemployment trends, simply as a tax, using 
proxies for the generosity or cost of the programme accordingly. The contention here is 
that public pension contributions are neither simply another tax on wages nor a pure 
form of retirement saving.  
By measuring how far returns to public pension within and across generations 
differ from those in an ‘actuarial’ scheme in any given setting, we are able to provide 
separate indicators of public pension programme design.  Using these indicators, the 
paper shows that, the closer the public pension programme is to an ‘actuarial-based’ 
programme, the greater its substitutability for private retirement saving.  In Disney 
(2004) I show that the impacts on labour force participation go in the opposite direction 
to the saving results (as the stylised theory would predict) although they are only robust 
for women.  In contrast, a public pension programme that is more like a tax-and-transfer 
programme, with little link between individual benefits and contributions, has little effect 
on saving. 
In the final section, I focus on how actual public pension reforms might affect 
household saving rates, using the United States characteristics to illustrate the point.  The 
effects of public pension reform on saving are significant, although perhaps not as large 
as some reform advocates suggest.  But it should be borne in mind that reforms that 
generate large effects on private saving often use highly stylised models of public pension 
programmes, and that much of the measured effect on private saving rates comes from 
accounting changes rather than changes in household behaviour.  It would be interesting   22
to focus on household data sets to pursue this issue further, and a few studies now focus 
on reforms to provide the ‘policy experiments’ required.  So far, however, such studies 
have exploited the reform to estimate saving responses, but not analysed the content of 
the reforms themselves.  The question of whether policy reforms can therefore be 
designed to increase saving remains an open issue. 
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Appendix 
 
Definitions of variables 
 
Age-activity rate: Proportion of age group i at t economically active. Derived from ILO 
statistics website LABORSTA and from extrapolation where annual data unavailable e.g. 
Switzerland, UK. 
 
Household saving rate: Average household saving rate as a % of GDP over the decade. 
Derived from OECD online data and (for 1970s) from Callen and Thimann (1997). 
 
Pension RR:  These are the average expected gross public pension replacement rates 
constructed by Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998), Table III.3 for 1961, 1975 and 1995.  They 
are stylised indicators of what a 55 year old at each date could expect, in terms of public 
pension benefits relative to earned income at retirement, if that individual started work at 
age 20 (ibid, Box III.1).  By interpolation (with adjustments where pension reforms seem 
to have had significant impacts, as in the United Kingdom in the late 1970s) and by 
extrapolation to the mid-1950s, I have used these data to construct mid-decade estimates 
of expected replacement rates for a 55 year old in 1955, 1965, 1975, 1985 and 1995.  The 
resulting data are given in Table A2.  It is both striking how much replacement rates 
differ across countries, and also how, in many countries, these rates have increased 
systematically over time. 
. 
The support ratio:  ILO data on activity rates gives the ratio of actual workers aged 15-59 to 
people aged over 60.  To convert this ratio into an effective support ratio, I make a 
couple of additional assumptions.  First, I remove all workers aged under 20 and over 60, 
on the grounds that their contribution to total contribution revenue is likely to be low 
(low incomes and/or low hours).  Secondly, it should not be assumed that all people 
over 60 receive a pension from the public programme – as described earlier, most 
countries have a contribution requirement underpinning eligibility for benefits.  As an 
approximation, I take all men as eligible for a pension, and the proportion of women 
eligible as equivalent to the highest rate of participation observed in each decade’s cross-
section of participation rates for women.  So, for example, if the highest 5 year age band 
participation rate is 70%, I assume that this percentage will receive a full pension.  Since 
non-contributors are generally entitled to some benefits, especially widows (and widowers 
without their own pension rights), I use information on rights to survivors benefits 
(which varies across these countries from 0% to 100% of the original award) from the 
US Public pension Administration’s Survey of country pension programmes.  
 
The data are depicted in Table A1. 
 
Actual contribution rates, although sometimes used in ‘tax wedge’ calculations, are almost 
useless for purposes of estimating effective tax rates.  Some countries, such as Australia 
and New Zealand, do not levy separate contributions at all – in these countries, public 
pensions are financed out of general taxation. In other countries, such as Greece and 
Italy, effective contribution rates have understated the ‘true’ costs of paying pensions, for 
many years being subsidised by direct budgetary transfers and borrowing.  Finally, in 
some other countries, assets are accumulated within the public pension programme (such 
as the US public pension Trust Fund), which implies that the measured contribution rate 
exceeds that required to finance current pension expenditure.  In contrast, some 
countries, such as Japan, have systematically run down accrued public pension assets   25
over time.  Finally, some countries (such as the United Kingdom) can more-or-less 
automatically adjust contribution rates to finance outgoings, whereas other countries 
(such as the United States) require legislation to vary contribution rates, and approval is 
not always forthcoming. 
 
Pension contribution is Pension RR divided by The Support Ratio 
 
Pension tax:  Blöndal and Scarpetta (1998) report expected pension replacement rates for 
four categories of 55 year old contributors – single people and couples, on average 
earnings and at 66% of average earnings.  These calculations capture two dimensions of 
departures from intragenerational actuarial fairness – that contributors at different 
earning levels are treated differently and that contributors in couples may or may not get 
differential benefits relative to contributions (especially when their partners are not 
working).   To give an example from the Blöndal and Scarpetta data, the 1995 figures for 
replacement rates for Belgium are singles at m e a n  e a r n i n g s :  6 0 % ,  a t  6 6 %  o f  m e a n  
earnings: 60%; couples at mean earnings: 75%, at 66% of mean earnings: 75%.  Clearly in 
one dimension there is approximate actuarial fairness (earnings level) but not in another 
(singles v. couples).  Compare this with Australia where the respective replacement rates 
are 37%, 24%, 62% and 41%, and where there are departures in both dimensions. 
  
The following indicator is constructed: if the four Blöndal and Scarpetta expected 
replacement rates are identical for each country-time observation, Pension tax is zero. If 
the rates vary, then the coefficient of variation of the replacement rates gives an 
approximate measure of the departure from actuarial fairness in each country and time 
period (the normalisation does not affect the ranking – a similar ordering would occur if, 
say, the mean square error was used). 
 
IRR at 65: For each of the 22 countries examined in this study, the average replacement 
rates serve two purposes.  First, they permit us to construct expected pension benefits 
for three cohorts of individuals in each country – those aged 55 in respectively, 1975, 
1985 and 1995.  I term these three cohorts as those born in 1920, 1930 and 1940, who 
are assumed to retire in, respectively, the mid- 1980s, 1990s and 2000s.   
 
Given these values, the internal rates of return are constructed as follows.  In each 
decade, the contribution rate is applied to average earnings, which grow in each decade in 
real terms at the average rate reported in OECD data.  It is assumed that the first cohort, 
born 1920, only starts contributing in 1950 (to capture the advantage accruing to the 
earliest generation) but that the subsequent generations contribute into their fourth (or 
even fifth) decade of work, depending on average retirement age.  The replacement rate 
is then applied to real earnings at retirement, and the pension is increased in line with 
subsequent earnings growth if earnings indexation is in place.  Many countries indexed 
benefits to earnings until the 1980s; thereafter shifts to price indexation or partial 
indexation are common.  Expected age of death is taken from Blöndal and Scarpetta 
(checked on ILO data) with survivors’ benefits paid at the appropriate rate for that 
country until the spouse’s expected age of death. 
 
The internal rate of return is then computed as that rate of return at which the present 
value of the (negative) stream of contributions paid is equal to the present value of the 
(positive) stream of pension benefits.  In Disney (2004), I present some calculations from 
other sources of IRRs for particular cohorts to compare with these numbers (e.g. from   26
Germany, Italy and the UK – most other countries in this sample have had no 
comparable calculations to my knowledge).  
 
Retirement test index and Earliest pension age are described in the text. 
 
Demand shocks is the Blanchard-Wolfers (2000) measure of changes in aggregate demand, 
as described at http://econ-wp.mit.edu/RePEc/2000/blanchar/harry_data/.   
 
Union density, as described by Nickell and Layard (1999) contains only cross-country 
variation in that source.  Time variation for this variable was obtained by exploiting 
information on union density across countries over time held at Cornell University. See 
the document:  
http://www.ilr.cornell.edu/library/downloads/FAQ/UNIONSTATS2002.pdf.   
 
Employment protection index: This variable is the time-varying index constructed by 
Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) and described at their website cited above. 
 
     Table A1          
Effective support ratios of workers to pensioners, 1955-95 
 Country  1955 1965 1975 1985  1995 
       
Australia 2.63 2.68 2.82 2.80  2.78 
Austria 2.61 2.12 2.12 2.28  2.28 
Belgium 2.12 1.93 1.99 2.07  1.96 
Canada 3.08 3.07 3.20 3.20  3.05 
Denmark 2.82 2.37 2.46 2.76  2.79 
Finland 4.12 3.26 3.13 2.94  2.66 
France 2.46 2.29 2.46 2.53  2.34 
Germany 2.95 2.37 2.45 2.62  2.46 
Greece 3.22 2.44 2.09 2.05  2.08 
Ireland 2.21 1.94 2.21 2.37  2.61 
Italy 2.90 2.43 2.35 2.18  2.00 
Japan 4.42 4.05 3.68 2.94  2.25 
Luxembourg 2.50 2.10 2.05 2.27  2.22 
Netherlands 2.27 2.27 2.37 2.53  2.56 
New Zealand  2.77 2.63 2.78 2.83  2.95 
Norway 2.35 1.96 2.03 2.13  2.32 
Portugal 2.63 2.20 2.61 2.60  2.34 
Spain 3.16 2.55 2.61 2.46  2.22 
Sweden 2.35 2.05 2.06 2.08  2.19 
Switzerland 2.63 2.39 2.35 2.43  2.41 
UK 2.27 2.09 1.98 2.01  2.10 
US 2.68 2.53 2.53 2.63  2.75 
                 
Average 2.78 2.44 2.47 2.49 2.42 
 
Source: ILO online data and own calculations as described in Disney (2004).  27
 
Table A2 
Effective contribution rates to public pension programmes  




Source: Author’s calculations, using Table A1, interpolated data from Blöndal and 
Scarpetta (1998), and text equation (2). 
 
Country  1955 1965 1975 1985 1995 
    
Australia 7.3 9.2 11.6 13.2  14.7 
Austria 30.5 37.5 37.5 34.9  34.8 
Belgium 34.2 37.1 35.4 33.3  34.4 
Canada 10.2 12.0 14.1 15.1  16.9 
Denmark 12.7 16.2 17.2 17.9  20.1 
Finland 8.5 13.6 18.7 20.2  22.5 
France 20.3 24.1 25.4 25.2  27.7 
Germany 20.4 25.3 24.3 21.9  22.4 
Greece 15.5 25.4 38.2 48.8  57.7 
Ireland 17.4 17.9 13.1 14.4  15.2 
Italy 20.7 25.0 26.4 32.5  40.0 
Japan 5.6 9.0 14.7 18.1  23.2 
Luxembourg 32.0 38.1 39.1 38.1  42.1 
Netherlands 14.2 17.0 20.2 18.6  17.9 
New Zealand  11.6 13.8 15.5 18.4  20.8 
Norway 10.7 20.2 30.2 28.4  25.8 
Portugal 32.4 37.2 29.5 30.7  35.4 
Spain 15.8 19.6 19.1 30.5  45.0 
Sweden 22.9 30.8 37.4 36.3  33.9 
Switzerland 10.8 15.8 22.0 20.8  20.4 
UK 14.7 16.0 17.1 20.8  23.7 
US 14.6 17.0 19.4 20.0  20.4 
    
Average 17.4 21.7 23.9 25.4  28.0   28
 
Table A3 
Internal Rates of Return to public pension programme contributions by cohort:      









     
Australia 1.63  -0.01  1.19 
Austria  2.71 1.05 1.11 
Belgium  1.06 0.12 1.10 
Canada  2.10 0.41 0.74 
Denmark 1.67  -0.05  1.42 
Finland  5.34 1.75 1.60 
France  3.03 1.03 1.20 
Germany  4.58 2.35 1.34 
Greece  3.04 0.14 0.60 
Ireland  -0.30 0.32 0.08 
Italy  5.84 2.87 0.99 
Japan  6.73 2.66 1.79 
Luxembourg  -0.26 -1.39 -0.24 
Netherlands  10.32 5.67 3.32 
New Zealand  0.50  -0.30  0.35 
Norway 2.86  -0.16  1.51 
Portugal  6.80 4.34 2.66 
Spain  7.04 4.42 3.59 
Sweden  5.40 2.10 0.89 
Switzerland 2.56 0.09  -0.53 
UK 0.39  -0.42  0.35 
US 0.45  -0.41  1.09 
     
Average  3.34 1.21 1.19 
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